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Abstract (englisch)
This contribution gives an overview of the main results of our theoretical research on the stability and change of labour market institutions. We use so-called models of unionised oligopolies which are borrowed from the theory of industrial organization in order to analyse the effects of simultaneous market power in both labour and product markets. The focus of our research is on the interaction between various organisational structures of labour markets and different forms of product market competition. In particular, we analyse some current developments in Germany, such as the introduction of sector-specific minimum wages, the formation of craft unions, the increasing number of profit sharing contracts as well as the relocation of production facilities to foreign countries in the context of globalisation.
English Summary:
In Germany, industrial relations used to be dominated by collective wage agreements between industry wide unions and employers' associations. This system has become less and less stable, mainly due to increasing competition from "outsiders"-firms and unions outside the industry-wide agreement. Recent developments such as firm's abandonment of collective wage agreements ("Tarifflucht") or increasing competition between (or plurality of) different wage agreements ("Tarifkonkurrenz" or "Tarifpluralität") have become important topics in the (still) ongoing debate on the future of German labour market institutions. This development is reflected by changes to laws and new fields of government action. For example, minimum wage laws have recently been introduced for some sectors, and the law on collective wage agreements ("Tarifvertragsgesetz") has been amended.
The interrelation between product and labour markets has for a long time not been the focus of neither the labour nor the industrial economics literature. Until the 1980s, the theoretical labour market literature either assumed that product markets are either monopolistic or perfectly competitive. Excellent surveys of this pre-1990 literature are Oswald (1985) and Ulph and Ulph (1990) . Since the end of the 1980s, a decent number of papers were published which simultaneously account for imperfections (i.e., market power) in both product and labour markets. These models are referred to as "unionised oligopoly" models. We apply these models in order to analyse the introduction of minimum wages in the German postal sector.
Both, the reasons for the minimum wage laws and the effects of the collective wage agreement of 2007, can only be properly understood when taking the competitive structures of the industry into account (Monopolkommission, 2007) . For an overview of the literature on unionised oligopolies see Göddeke (2010a) .
Our research focuses on selected topics in unionised industries. First, section 2 introduces the institutions of the German labour legislation. It also discusses a model of minimum wages in the postal sector. Section 3 then discusses selected issues of wage bargaining on the firm level (in contrast to the industry level). This has become important as the co-existence of different collective agreements within a firm is no longer ruled out by jurisdiction. More specifically, we discuss the introduction of industry unions (section 3.1) and profit sharing (section 3.2). In section 4, we further elaborate on different aspects of globalisation and international competition. In particular, we compare the effects of decentralised and more centralised wage setting regimes. Finally, we summarise our main findings as follows:
 In principal, employers can leave the collective wage agreements and negotiate firm specific wage contracts. However, our analysis reveals that a number of legal rules result in weak incentives for deviations from the collective agreement.
 The Posting of Workers Act ("Entsendegesetz") enabled the established parties to prevent entry of (initially) less efficient competitors in the postal sector since a (very high) minimum wage had been introduced.
 From the analysis of minimum wages in the postal sector we conclude that industry specific minimum wages may have strong effects on employment in labour intensive industries. The possibility for established firms to apply for and influence the extent of a sector specific minimum wage facilitates a "raising rivals' cost"-strategy which deters entry.
 When wage negotiations take place on the firm level heterogeneous craft unions lead to a decrease in overall welfare (and also firms' profits) than in a system with more centralised collective wage bargaining. Nevertheless, unions prefer industry-wide contracts over firm-specific contracts.
 In several markets, the ongoing globalisation increases the number of competing firms. This makes centralised wage agreements among the different parties with very different interests difficult. However, it also fosters profit sharing contracts which increase overall welfare, as our analysis shows.
 In contrast to other strands of literature, we cannot confirm that collective wage agreements have a negative impact on the competitiveness of domestic industries.
 Domestic firms benefit from relocation threats of international competitors, especially with collective wage agreements. This is mainly driven by the fact that centrally negotiated wages are decreasing for all (both national as well as international) firms.
With lower labour costs for all firms, product market prices decrease which, in turn, increases overall welfare.
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Schlussfolgerungen
In diesem Beitrag haben wir dargestellt, wie der wettbewerbsökonomische Ansatz, der sowohl 
